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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
W. B. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 





DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN 
ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the defendant in the above cause and re-
spectfully petitions this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff's 
Petition for Rehearing for the reasons that: 
I. 
The court in its opinion did not err in holding that the 
lower court had no juris diction to order the plaintiff's re-
instatement with the defendant company. 
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2 
II. 
The court did not err in holding that the statements 
in the transcr:ipt relating to plaintiff's illness were hearsay, 
and did not err in holding that the lower cour:t was in error 
in considering such statements as substantive evidence. 
III. 
The court did not err in holding that the transcript 
was improperly considered by the lower court as the ex-
clusive evidence of the facts therein testified to. 
IV. 
The court did not err in holding that the lower court 
committed reversible error in rejecting defendant's evidence 
that the plaintiff had falsified at the hearing and was in 
fact not ill during the period in question. 
v. 
The court did not err in holding that the defendant 
had a right to present any legal o~_ equitable defense at 
the trial to prove justification for the discharge and that 
the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting such 
proffered testimony. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING REHEARING 
Out of deference to the rules governing the format of 
briefs on appeal before this court we have set forth above 
the negative of the five propositions asserted by counsel 
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for the plaintiff in his brief on petition for rehearing. 
Only two propositions are in fact arg·ued by the plaintiff 
and he sets them forth on page 5 of his brief as follows: 
"(1) The court erred in holding that the lower 
court had no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's re-
instatement with defendant company with seniority 
rights unimpaired. 
"(2) The court erred in holding that it was 
for the trial court to determine whether the grounds 
for discharge in fact existed, and in this determina-




THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURIS-
DICTION TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFF'S RE-
INSTATEMENT WITH DEFENDANT COM-
pANY WITH SENIORITY RIGHTS UNIM-
PAIRED. 
It is here said that the court's action-was purely "gra- -
tuitous" for the reason that the issue of reinstatement was 
not involved. The plaintiff says that he is not concerned 
with this "error" in the opinion and then proceeds to cite 
four cases on page 6 of the brief in support of his asser-
tion that it was error to hold that the lower court was with-
out jurisdiction even if reinstatement had been an issue. 
All of the cases cited, in so far as they conflict with the 
recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in 
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·slocum v. Dela~vare, Lackawana & Western Railroad, 339 
U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, on the matter of 
reinstatement have been overruled and superseded by this 
opinion of the court of last resort. We do not care to dis-
cuss. the propriety of this court's discussion of the matter 
of reinstatement at any length. We think neither the 
opinion nor the "general policy" of the court needs any 
defense from us in ·this .respect. The plaintiff has refused 
to recognize the existence of the Slocum case throughout 
the trial and throughout the briefs on appeal. The trial 
court also refused to recognize the existence of the Slocum 
case and this was the "fundamental error" as pointed out 
in the opinion. In reaching the conclusion in this case 
that a common-law action for damages for breach of con-
tract and nothing else was available to plaintiff, as held 
in the Slocum case and as contended for by the defendant 
throughout, it was proper and necessary for this court to 
consider and discuss the rationale of the Slocum case. We 
do not think that the court was "gratuitously" deciding 
an issue not before it when during its discussion of the 
Slocum case as a whole it pointed out that the lower court 
was correct in refusing reinstatement. The court was re-
viewing an entirely new concept of the law on the rights 
and liabilities of parties to collective bargaining agreements 
under the Railway Labor Act as they were redefined in the 
·slocum case, wh~ch decision was not written until April 
of 1950. It was necessary to an understanding of and 
formed the basis of the court's treatment of the specific 
assignments of error which the court was called upon to 
dispose of. After the discussion objected to, the opinion 
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proceeded to say that while the trial court had correctly 
held it had no jurisdiction to grant reinstatement it "pro-
ceeded to adjudicate the case in all other respects in the 
same manner as might be done by such Board (National 
Railroad Adjustment Board). In so doing we are confi-
dent it erred. Thus concluding relative to the fundamental 
error alleged, we address ourselves to the several assign-
ments of error with more particularity." At any rate we 
do not understand counsel's concern over the matter for 
he must be well aware of the fact that if reinstatement 
was, as he says, not in issue, anything this court said there-
on could only be considered as dicta. 
II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT IT WAS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE 
GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE IN FACT EX-
ISTED, AND DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE EX-
ISTED THE PARTIES WERE NOT CONFINED 
TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING. 
This is nothing but Point III in plaintiff's main brief 
on appeal, appearing at page 21 thereof. For the conven-
ience of the court we quote from plaintiff's main brief: 
"Point III. The trial court did not err in lim-
iting the evidence on the question of whether or 
not defendant had breached the collective bargain-
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ing agreement solely upon the transcript of the un-
sworn testimony given at the official investigation, 
in refusing to admit evidence proffered by the de-
fendant to show justification for plaintiff's dismis-
sal, and in refusing to permit the defendant to prove 
that the plaintiff's testimony contained in said trans-
cript was false." 
This court holds the court did err therein. The point 
was argued at length in plaintiff's main brief on appeal, 
and while it is argued further and in greater detail in the 
brief on Petition for Rehearing it does not seem to us that 
counsel presents anything new. This court in its opinion 
has properly held that the question plaintiff now seeks re-
consideration of is one to be determined by the trial court 
after a proper hearing, which was not· accorded the de-
fendant in the court below. 
Plaintiff says on page 3 of his brief, "What we here 
seek is a reconsideration by the court of the single question 
of whether this plaintiff was accorded his contractual 
rights, that is, was Rule 38 of the contract complied with." 
From a careful reading of plaintiff's entire brief and 
analysis thereof it is apparent that there is in fact, as 
counsel himself says, just this one question which is sub-
mitted to the court for reconsideration. For convenience 
we again quote the language of the rule : 
"Article VIII, Rule 38. No yardman will be 
suspended or dismissed. without first having a fair 
and impartial hearing and his guilt established. The 
man whose case is under consideration may be rep-
resented by an employe of his choice, who may be 
a committeeman, who will be permitted to interro-
gate witnesses. The accused and his representative 
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shall be permitted to hear the testimony of wit-
nesses." 
Counsel says that the following five conditions to proper 
discharge are required by the rule: 
(1) A fair and impartial hearing; 
( 2) The right to be represented; 
. (3) The right to interrogate witnesses; 
( 4) The right to hear the testimony of wit-
nesses; 
( 5) The establishment of his guilt. 
The burden of plaintiff's argument is that these matters · 
were not established prior to the discharge. Counsel's whole 
trouble, it seems to us, is in th~ failure to recognize that 
whether these matters were or were not established prior 
to the discharge is, first, a matter for determination by a 
court or jury, and second, "having elected to bring a com-
mon-law action for wrongful discharge, the common-law 
principles relative to such action apply to the trial of the 
case", quoting from the court's opinion. 
We think the foregoing is the gist of the court's opinion 
and it is, by plaintiff's own assertion, the portion of the 
opinion excepted to in· his petition for rehearing. The hold-
ing is consistent with every adjudicated case we have been 
able to find; we have found none to the contrary and 
counsel cites none to the contrary that have not been swept 
into the discard by the Slocum decision. This court's hold-
ing recognizes and respects the holding of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the Slocum case; that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
discharged employe may have a common-law action for 
damages for breach of contract in ~he courts of the land, 
but nothing else. And because that is the nature of the 
action, it is bound to follow that the court and jury must 
determine whether or not the contract has been breached, 
and . either party to. the action in a court of law has the 
right to produce any and all material, relevant and com-
petent evidence in existence bearing upon that issue. 
It is evident from an analysis of plaintiff's brief that 
the whole of his attack is leveled at the holding of the court 
set out in the following paragraph, to wit: 
"Several assignments of error, presently to be 
individually considered, are bottomed on one funda-
mental contention. Defendant concedes that the re-
spondent, although a railway labor employee and 
subject to the Railway Labor Act, might prosecute 
an action in the District court for wrongful dis-
Gharge. But it contends that the respondent, having 
elected to bring a common-law action for wrongful 
discharge, the common-law principles relative to such 
action apply to the trial of the case; and that the 
court is without jurisdiction to construe the contract 
and to apply its provisions in such manner as might 
be done by the Railroad Adjustment Board pursuant 
to the provision of the National Railway Labor 
Act. (U. S. Code, Title 45, Chapter 8.) Appellant's 
position on this fundamental proposition is sound. 
That a distinction exists between proceedings before 
such Board and the awards which might be made 
by it, and a common-law action before the courts is, 
we think, abundantly clear from the cases of Slocum 
v. Delaware, Lackawana and Western Railroad, 339 
U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, and Moore 
v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 312 U. S. 630, 
61 S. Ct. 754." (Italics ours.) 
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The position taken by this court in the above quoted pas-
sage is we submit absolutely sound in the light of the cases 
therein cited. The plaintiff asks this court, without citing 
a single authority in point, to ignore the authorities sup-
porting its position and reverse itself on this one "funda-
mental contention" made· by the defendant throughout this 
litigation. To do so would be for this court to reverse itself 
upon every point decided, except the issue of damages, 
which plaintiff's counsel concedes is correctly decided, and 
would require the court to remand the case to the lower 
court solely· for the purpose of fixing the amount of dam-
ages. The holding of the court in the above quoted para-
graph is not only supported by the authorities therein re-
ferred to, but by the case of Tennison v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo .... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, and 
Johnson v. Thompson, ... Mo .... , 236 S. W. 2d 1, cited 
and discussed in the defendant's brief on appeal. The 
Tennison case was in point on the facts and the court 
therein refused to admit the transcript of the testimony at 
the official investigation on the ground that it was hearsay. 
The court said: 
"What the contract provided was that trainmen 
would not be discharged 'without just and sufficient 
cause'. Methods were provided for a full investiga-
tion of charges and hearing of the employee's side 
before action. (The point so stressed by plaintiff 
here.) However, defendant is no more precluded 
thereby from litigating in court the issue of 'just 
and ~sufficient cause' than is plaintiff.~ Both may 
bring in any competent ·evidence they have and ob-
ject to any incompetent evidence." (Italics ours.) 
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For a full discussion of the case see defendant's brief on 
appeal at pages 23, 24, 25, 26. To the same effect is the 
Johnson case discussed in our main brief at pages 26 and 
27. 
Counsel for the plaintiff and the trial court refused 
to recognize the existence of these cases or the soundness 
of the principles therein asserted. This field of the law 
being a new development, there are very few cases we have 
been able to find that were "pinpoint" authorities. We 
have found· none holding contrary and counsel has at no 
time cited any. 
There are, however, two cases of signif~cance which 
have been decided since our main brief was written, which 
follow the Johnson and Tennison cases and support this 
court in that portion of its opinion now assailed. 
In Wilson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo . 
. . . , 247 S. W. 2d 644, decided March 10, 1952, rehearing 
denied April 14, 1952 by the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
the facts in so far as pertinent were these: Wilson, an 
engineer, was discharged by the defendant for failure to 
observe and obey certain signals, which resulted in a train 
wreck. In a suit for damages against the defendant he 
charged that he was "discharged without just and sufficient 
cause after a purported investigation and hearing which 
was entirely arbitrary." (This is precisely what the plain-
tiff contends for in this suit.) The railroad company took 
the position that Wilson, the employe in this instance, was 
confined at the trial to the evidence brought out at the hear-
ing. The trial court permitted Wilson to produce whatever 
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evidence he had that he had obeyed the sig-nals and the ques-
tion of whether there \vas just and sufficient cause for 
his discharge \Vas litig-ated before the jury. The trial court 
instructed that it was for the jury to determine whether 
just and sufficient cause for the discharg-e in fact existed, 
and this action \Vas affirmed by the Supreme Court. The 
court said: 
"Wilson's evidence at the trial tended to show 
that he obeyed the sig-nals, the railroad's evidence 
tended to show that he violated the sig-nals and the 
rules, and whether he did or did not and whether 
he was discharged without good and sufficient cause 
were for the jury to determine." 
This, we submit, is consistent with the opinion of this court 
upon which plaintiff's counsel asks this court to now re-
verse itself and grant a rehearing. 
In the case of Craig v. Thompson, . . . Mo. . .. , 244 S. 
W. 2d 37, decided November 12, 1951 and since we wrote 
our main brief on appeal, the facts so far as pertinent were 
as follows: The plaintiff, a brakeman, was discharged for 
failure to answer a work call and thereafter brought suit 
in tlle courts to recover damages for unlawful discharge. 
He claimed that he was wrongfully and unlawfully dis-
charged by the defendant, that the discharge was not for 
good and sufficient cause, and he was not accorded a fair 
and impartial investigation by the defendant, in violation 
of the company's agreement with its employes. The court 
in its opinion said: 
"The basic facts determinative of this appeal 
upon the question of whether plaintiff's discharge 
was or was not wrongful are not in dispute." 
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But the court held that the question as to whether or not 
the discharge was rightful or wrongful was to be passed 
upon and decided by the court or jury. The court said : 
"Whether a certain state of facts as to which 
there is no dispute amounts to a legal justification 
for discharge i. e., whether the discharge was or 
was not wrongtul, is a question of law for the court, 
but where the facts are in dispute as to whether the 
discharge was or was not wrongful, the question is 
always one for the jury under proper instructions." 
This case likewise supports this court in its holding upon 
this proposition which is the subject of attack in plaintiff's 
petition for rehearing. These are cases involving the al-
leged breach of collective bargaining agreements entered 
into pursuant to the National Railway Labor Act. These 
cases concern themselves with the "fundamental conten-
tion" made by us,. as does this court in its opinion. Counsel 
attacks the holding of the court upon this "fundamental 
contention", but in no respect does he address himself per-
tinently thereto. He concentrates upon the proposition that 
Rule 38 was not complied with before the plaintiff was 
discharged, a matter upon which he might be entitled to 
be heard before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 
But in a court of law such an argument is utterly incon-
sistent with the proposition laid down by the above cited 
cases and by this court in the main opinion to the effect 
that in the trial of a common-law action for wrongful dis-
charge the common-law principles relative to such action 
apply to the trial of the case. And that it is for the judge 
or jury in. the last analysis to determine whether the dis-
charge was wrongful or not. The plaintiff chose his forum 
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and must therefore permit the courts to adjudicate the 
questions involved. This court in its opinion has said that 
the question for decision by the trial court is whether or 
not the plaintiff was unjustly discharged, and the opinion 
says to us, "In this case it (defendant) must win or lose 
upon that issue." We are content with this holding; think 
we are entitled to that much and no more. What is there 
about it that is "unfair, unjust or inequitable" to the plain-
tiff or to other employes that'may in the future be similarly 
situated? This court's opinion preserves to the plaintiff 
all the rights and remedies any litigant at any time has ever 
had in the courts in the kind of action that he himself 
elected to bring. The plaintiff asks this court in defiance 
of the opinion in the Slocum case, supra, to usurp the jur-
isdiction and prerogatives or the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board. It seems to us that the plaintiff endeavors 
to secure for himself the advantages that might have come 
to him from a hearing before ·the Railroad Adjustment 
Board, escape the disadvantages of a hearing before such 
Board, and to secure for himself such advantages as he has 
before a court or jury-without submitting to the established 
rules of practice and procedure applicable in actions of this 
kind. Even prior to the Slocum case the plaintiff would 
have been required to make an election to proceed either 
in the courts or take his grievance to the Board, and it 
was generally held that once he made the election he was 
bound thereby. 
CONCLUSION 
We concede the right of plaintiff's counsel to get him-
self in as good a position as possible for the retrial of this 
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case. We disagree with many things he has said in the 
brief and many interpretations he has put upon various 
incidental statements of the court. We do not believe, how-
ever,· that a discussion of anything other than this one 
"fundamental proposition" is called for here and we are 
satisfied to confine ourselves to the one issue counsel has 
elected to attack the opinion upon. 
We respectfully submit that the Petition for Rehearing 
should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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